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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RACHEL ARMELINDA CINTRON,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 16440

ELMA J. MILKOVICH,
Defendant and
Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to recover damages for injuries arising out
of an automobile accident which occurred on Saturday, February 14,
1976, at about 5:00 p.m. on Center Street in Midvale, Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried before The Honorable Ernest F.
Baldwin, Judge, sitting with a jury.

In answering a special ver-

diet, the jury concluded that defendant was negligent in that
she failed to keep a proper lookout and failed to yield the
right-of-way to plaintiff.

The jury also concluded that

plaintiff was negligent in that she failed to keep her vehicle
under reasonable, safe and proper control, and drove at a speed
that was not safe, reasonable and prudent under the circumstances.

The jury entered a finding of 60 percent causal negligence

-1-
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on the part of the defendant and 40 percent causal negligence on
the part of the plaintiff.

Defendant filed and argued a motion

for a new trial, which motion was denied by the court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant/appellant seeks reversal of the judgment
of the lower court and judgment in defendant's favor as a matter
of law or, in the alternative, a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
~

~~-

The accident upon which plaintiff premises her cause of
action occurred at approximately 5:00 p.m. on Saturday, the 14th
day of February, 1976, approximately 26 feet west of the intersection of Center and Allen Streets in Midvale, Utah.

Center

Street runs east and west, consisting of two through lanes in
each direction.

Allen Street runs north and south with one lane

in each direction.

As Center Street approaches the intersection

with Allen Street, it becomes wider so as to include left turn
lanes in each direction of travel to accomodate traffic turning
on to Allen Street from Center Street.

The eastbound and west-

bound lanes on Center Street are separated by a raised island on
each side of the intersection with Allen Street.
5-P and 8-D).

(See Exhibits

The speed limit on Center Street as it approaches

the intersection with Allen Street is 35 miles per hour.

Traff~

approaching Center Street from the south on Allen Street is
required to stop at a stop sign before entering or crossing
Center Street.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The accident involved in this litigation occurred during
a daylight hour.

The surface of Center Street was dry.

Immediately

prior to the accident plaintiff, who was 19 at the time, was traveling west on Center Street in the inside lane.

Plaintiff was

accompanied by a friend, Lonnie Miyagishima, who was seated in
the front seat on the passenger side, and plaintiff's sister,
Tanya Salazar, who was sitting in the back seat.

At this same

time defendant was approaching Center Street from the south on
Allen Street.

Defendant was accompanied by her son, Ray Hinckle,

who was sitting in the middle of the back seat and her daughter,
Lynnette Lemmon, who was sitting in the front seat on the
passenger side.
At trial plaintiff testified that when she last observed
the speedometer of her car, a few moments before the accident,
she was traveling at 30 miles per hour

(Tr. 46).

Plaintiff's

sister, Tanya Salazar, testified that she observed plaintiff's
speed at about the same time and that such speed was between 30
and 35 miles per hour

(Tr. 90).

Grant Elsby, the Midvale City

policeman who investigated this accident, testified that plaintiff stated, in a conversation with Officer Elsby at the scene
shortly after the accident, that she was traveling at approximately 40 miles per hour at the time of the accident (Tr. 32,41).
Defendant's daughter, Lynnette Lemmon, testified that in this
conversation plaintiff stated that she was traveling between 40
and 45 miles per hour

(Tr. 110).

Defendant also stated that in
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this conversation plaintiff stated her speed was between 40 and
45 miles per hour (Tr. 122).

Plaintiff stated that she had told

Officer Elsby that she was going between 30 and 40 miles per
hour at the time of the accident (Tr. 60).

Plaintiff also testU

that she accelerated her automobile after she last observed the
speedometer prior to the accident so as to maintain her speed up
a rise in the grade of Center Street as it approaches the intersection with Allen Street (Tr. 59).
As plaintiff, traveling west on Center Street,
approached the intersection of Center Street and Allen Street,
defendant was approaching this same intersection from the south
on Allen street.

Plaintiff first observed defendant's

vehicle~

defendant was approaching the stop sign on Allen Street (Tr. 46),
According to the plaintiff, defendant appeared to stop at the
stop sign but in fact did not stop (Tr. 46,47,57).

However, at

trial it was noted that plaintiff stated in her deposition that
defendant's vehicle appeared to stop at the stop sign (Tr. 62).
Defendant testified that she stopped at the stop sign, looked to
see if any vehicle was approaching, and then asked both her son
and daughter to look also (Tr. 114).

Defendant's son (Tr. 98)

and daughter (Tr. 105) both testified that defendant stopped at
the stop sign and that defendant asked both to look for oncoming
vehicles.
Defendant (Tr. 115), her daughter, Lynnette (Tr. 105),
and her son, Ray (Tr. 98), all stated that, upon checking for
oncoming vehicles approaching from either direction, they saw
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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nothing.

Because Center Street immediately east of the Allen

Street intersection dips as it passes under Interstate 15, it is
difficult for westbound traffic on Center Street to get an
unobstructed view of the Allen Street intersection as it
approaches such intersection from the east.
and 10-D).

(See Exhibits 5-P

For this same reason, it is difficult for traffic at

the intersection to see such westbound traffic.

Believing the

way to be clear, defendant proceeded into the intersection and
turned into the inside westbound lane.

Defendant estimated her

speed to be approximately 10 miles per hour when the accident
occurred (Tr. 78).
Upon observing defendant proceeding into the intersection, plaintiff slammed on her brakes (Tr. 47).

In doing so,

plaintiff's vehicle, according to Officer Elsby, left skid marks
approximately 37 feet 6 inches in length (Tr. 34).

Realizing

that she would be unable to stop in time to avoid a collision,
plaintiff released her brakes and swerved to the right (Tr. 47).
Officer Elsby indicated that the skid marks left by plaintiff's
vehicle ended at the west boundary of the intersection (Tr. 34,35).
Officer Elsby determined by measurement that the probable point
of impact was approximately 26 feet 1 inch from this same boundary (Tr. 35).

Plaintiff acknowledged that this point was indeed

the probable point of impact (Tr. 64).
At trial plaintiff called as a witness one Dr. Rudy
Limpert, an accident reconstruction expert.

For purposes of exa-
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mining Dr. Limpert, plaintiff's counsel asked Dr. Limpert to
assume that a vehicle was traveling at 35 miles per hour under
circumstances similar to those encountered by plaintiff.

(Tr.

7~

Dr. Limpert also assumed that the surface of the highway upon
which this vehicle was traveling had a coefficient of friction
of 0.65 (Tr. 781), the coefficient of friction of Center Street
as determined by a skid test performed by Officer Elsby

(Tr. 19)

Based on this assumption, Dr. Limpert testified that vigorous
braking of a vehicle traveling at 35 miles per hour would cause
that vehicle to stop within 63 feet (Tr. 781).

Because the

length of the skid marks of plaintiff's vehicle was 37 feet 6
inches and the distance from the termination of said skid marks
to the probable point of impact was 26 feet 1 inch, Dr. Limpert
testified that a vehicle traveling 35 miles per hour would have
stopped by the time it reached the probable point of impact
(Tr. 78n).
Dr. Limpert testified that defendant's vehicle had traveled approximately 90 feet from the time it entered the intersection to the time of impact (Tr. 780).

Since defendant's

spe~

at the point of impact was approximately 10 miles an hour, and
because defendant reached this speed from a standing start, Dr.
Limpert estimated that the average speed of defendant's vehicle,
assuming a uniform acceleration, was 5 miles per hour during th~
time span (Tr. 780).

Assuming this average speed, Dr. Limpert

concluded that it would have taken defendant approximately 12
seconds to cover the distance from the stop sign to the probable
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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point of impact (Tr. 780).

Dr. Limpert then testified that the

driver of a vehicle, traveling at a speed of 35 miles per hour,
would have first observed a vehicle entering the intersection
from the stop sign approximately 615 feet prior to reaching the
intersection (Tr. 780).

By comparison, the Interstate 15 viaduct

is 357.0 feet east of the east boundary of the intersection.
Exhibit 1-D).

(See

Finally, Dr. Limpert testified that, assuming an

average reaction time, and given the probable point of impact and
the length and location of the skid marks left by plaintiff's
vehicle, plaintiff first reacted approximately 115 feet from the
probable point of impact (Tr. 78p).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
BECAUSE PLAINTIFF'S VEHICLE WAS NOT AN
"IMMEDIATE HAZARD" WITHIN THE MEANING
OF UTAH CODE ANN. §41-6-72.10(2),
DEFENDANT COULD NOT BE GUILTY OF FAILING
TO YIELD THE RIGHT OF WAY TO PLAINTIFF.
According to Utah Code Ann. §41-6-72.10(2)

(1953), a

driver stopped at a stop sign, "shall yield the right of way to
any vehicle in the intersection or approaching on another roadway
so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard during the time
when such driver is moving across or within the intersection or
junction of roadways."

[Emphasis added.J

According to this sta-

tute, defendant was required to yield the right of way to plaintiff only if plaintiff's vehicle constituted an "immediate
hazard" during the time defendant was moving across or within the

-7-
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intersection.
This court, in

Richards~

Anderson, 9 Utah 2d 17, 337

P.2d 59 (1959), addressed the definition of the term "immediate
hazard".

This case involved an intersectional collision between

vehicles driven by Anderson and Richards.

After stopping at a

stop sign, Anderson proceeded into the intersection after two
drivers, traveling in the same direction as Richards, had
deferred to Anderson.

After traveling 38 feet, Anderson's and

Richards' vehicles collided.

In discussing the term "immediate

hazard", as it pertained to Richards' claim of right of way,
this court said:
[TJhe Supreme Court of Delaware has said
that an "immediate hazard" is created
when a vehicle approaches an intersection
on a favored street at ~ reasonable spe~d
under such circumstances that, if the disfavored driver proceeds into the intersection, it will force the favored driver
to sharply and suddenly check his
progress or stop in order to avoid collision.
(Citing Fusco.~ Dauphin, 47 Del.
140, 88 A.2d 813 (1950). Conversely, i f
the disfavored driver has made his stop
and deferred to all vehicles that would
be required to go into a sharp or sudden
braking to avoid collision, the cars far
enough away have a clear margin to
observe and make a smooth and safe stop
are not an "immediate hazard" and are
required to yield to the driver already
at the intersection. 337 P.2d at 61.
[Emphasis added.]
Defendant submits that plaintiff's vehicle was not "an
immediate hazard" within the definition given this term by this
court.

To begin with, plaintiff was not operating her vehicle~
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a reasonable speed.

Moreover, the fact that Officer Elsby deter-

mined the probable point of impact to be more than 26 feet west
of the west boundary of the intersection at issue is prima facie
evidence that plaintiff's vehicle was not an "immediate hazard"
while defendant was moving across or within the intersection.
Plaintiff's expert witness, Dr. Rudy Limpert, testified
that the accident occurred 12 seconds after defendant had entered
the intersection.

Dr. Limpert also testified that defendant's

vehicle had traveled 90 feet during such time span.

Finally, Dr.

Limpert testified that plaintiff, had she been traveling at the
speed limit of 35 miles per hour, would have been 615 feet east
of the intersection when defendant entered the intersection.

Yet

the evidence, according to Dr. Limpert, indicated that plaintiff
did not react until she was 115 feet from the point of impact.
Under these circumstances, defendant finds it difficult to
comprehend how plaintiff's vehicle could constitute an "immediate
hazard" so as to require defendant to yield the right of way to
plaintiff.
In support of her position defendant directs this
court's attention to its opinion in Richards, 330 P.2d at 61,
where, in holding in defendant's favor, it said:
It is clear that the defendant entered the
intersection considerably ahead of the
plaintiff. The question then becomes
whether plaintiff's automobile was so
close to the intersection to constitute an
"immediate hazard" to defendant when the
latter entered the intersection. There
is, of course, no precise set of measurements by which an immediate hazard can be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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guaged. It must be judged on the basis of
common sense in the light of existing
circumstances.

* * *

An analysis of the time, speed and
distance factors shows plainly that the
plaintiff had more than ample time to
observe the defendant and avoid colliding
with him.
Defendant maintains that the above quoted language
conclusively shows that plaintiff's vehicle was not "an immediab
hazard" within the meaning of the statute.

Plaintiff testified

that she saw defendant's vehicle approach the intersection and
proceed into the intersection.

Notwithstanding her observations

plaintiff proceeded to travel at the same speed and in the same
lane.

It is apparent that plaintiff had ample opportunity to

avoid this accident.

It is equally apparent that she failed to

avail herself of this opportunity.

As was said by this court in

Richards, 337 P.2d 15 at 61,62, "the plaintiff seemed to have
been guilty of the all too common fault of modern drivers of
assuming that because they are on a through highway they have

~

absolute right of way, and that one desiring to enter or cross t
must do so at his peril."
POINT II.
----THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING DEFENDANT'S JURY INSTRUCTION THAT, UNDER MIDVALE
CITY ORDINANCE §187(b), THE DRIVER OF ANY
VEHICLE TRAVELING AT AN UNLAWFUL SPEED SHALL
FORFEIT ANY RIGHT OF WAY WHICH SHE MIGHT
OTHERWISE HAVE.
Assuming arguendo that plaintiff's vehicle was an

"imrn~

diate hazard" as contemplated in Utah Code Ann. §41-6-72.10(2)
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(1953), defendant still could not be guilty of failure to yield
the right of way to the plaintiff because plaintiff forfeited,
under Midvale City Ordinance 8187(b), any right of way to which
she might be entitled.
Prior to trial, defendant filed a certified copy of
Midvale City Ordinance §187(b), which provided:
LOSING RIGHT OF WAY

* * *

(b) The driver of any vehicle traveling
at an unlawful speed shall forfeit any
right of way which he might otherwise have.
Pursuant to this provision, defendant submitted to the
court its requested jury instruction no. 18 which provided as
follows:
Under the ordinances of Midvale City it
is provided that the driver of any vehicle
traveling at an unlawful speed shall forfeit any right of way he might otherwise
have. If, therefore, you find from the
evidence in this case that the plaintiff's
vehicle was being driven at an unlawful
speed, then I instruct you that the right
of way which she might otherwise have had
at such intersection would be forfeited.
This instruction was a proper statement of the law as it existed
in Midvale City at the time of the accident.

Furthermore, this

instruction was warranted in view of the evidence received at
trial.

The issue as to whether the speed at which plaintiff was

operating her vehicle at the time of the accident was reasonable
and prudent under the conditions was framed at trial and properly
submitted to the jury.

(See Jury Instruction No. 17).

Nevertheless, the court, without explanation, refused defendant's

-11-
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jury instruction no. 18 and gave no instruction pertaining to a
forfeiture of plaintiff's right of way or the effects thereof h
the event the plaintiff was traveling at an unlawful speed.
Defendant took exception to the court's failure to

gi~

the requested instruction and filed and argued a motion for a ru
trial, which motion the lower court refused.

Defendant asserts

that the lower court committed prejudicial error in failing to
instruct the jury on the applicable law, for as the lower court
said in its second instruction to the jury, "It is the duty of
the court to instruct you in the law that applies to this case ..
Defendant is confident that this court, upon an examination of
the applicable law, will find that the lower court did commit
prejudicial error in refusing defendant's requested jury instrlli
tion no. 18.
Utah law with regard to traffic rules and regulationsi
found in Utah Code Ann. §§41-6-1 to 179 (1953).

With regard

to rights of way, as applied to this case, the statute reads as
follows:
Except when directed to proceed by police
officer, every driver of a vehicle approaching a stop sign shall mark at a clearly
marked stop line, but if none, before
entering the crosswalk on the near side
of the intersection, or if none, at the
point nearest the intersecting roadway where
the driver has a view of approaching traffic
on the intersecting roadway before entering
it. After having stopped, the driver shall
yield the right of way to any vehicle in
the intersection or approaching on another
roadway so closely as to cause an immediate
hazard during the time which such drive
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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is moving across or within the intersection
or junction of roadway.
Id. §41-6-72.10(2)
(Supp. 1979)
Defendant acknowledges that the operation of her automobile as
she approached and entered Center Street from Allen Street was
governed by the above quoted statute, and that by such statute
she was bound to yield the right of way to any vehicle on Center
Street having such a right of way.

Because the jury specifically

found that plaintiff was operating her vehicle at an unlawful
speed at the time of the accident, defendant asserts that plaintiff, under Midvale City Ordinance §187(b), forfeited any right
of way to which she might otherwise be entitled.

Accordingly,

plaintiff had no right of way to which defendant was obligated to
yield.
It is well established in Utah that a city has the right
to legislate on the same subject as a state statute under its
general police powers or as a result of an express grant of
authority from the legislature.

see, ~· Salt Lake City ~

Allred, 20 Utah 2d 298, 437 P.2d 434 (1968): Salt Lake
Kusse, 97 Utah 113, 93 P.2d 671 (1938).

City~

Notwithstanding this

principle, defendant recognizes that the traffic rules and regulations set forth by statute are required, by statute, to be
applied on a uniform basis statewide.
The provisions of this act shall be
applicable and uniform through the state
and in all political subdivisions and
municipalities therein and no local
authority shall enact or enforce any rule
or regulation in conflict with the provisions of this act unless expressly

-13-
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authorized herein.

Local authorities

~however, adopt reguiations con-

sistent with this act and additional
traffic regulatTOns which are not in
conflict therewith. U.C.A-:--941-6-16
(1953). (Emphasis added.]
It is defendant's contention that the statutory

langua~

emphasized immediately above is an express grant of authority to
Midvale City to adopt Midvale City Ordinance §187(b).

In furth 8

support of this proposition, defendant directs this court to
other statutory provisions.

In Utah Code Ann. §10-8-1 to 91

(1953), with regard to traffic regulations, the Legislature has
provided:
(The boards of commissioners and city
councils of cities] may regulate the
movement of ttaffic on the streets, sidewalks and public places, including the
movement of pedestrians as well as of
vehicles, and the cars and engines of
railroads, street railroads and tramways,
and may prevent racing and immoderate
driving and riding. Id. §10-8-30
Defendant submits that by this provision the legislature has

mad~

an express grant of authority to the City of Midvale to regulate
the movement of traffic within its boundaries.
Finally, the legislature has recognized the inherent
general police power of local authorities to regulate traffic
within the political confines of their cities.
The provisions of this chapter shall not
be deemed to prevent local authorities
with respect to streets and highways under
their jurisdiction and within the reasonable
exercise of the police power. • . • Id.
§41-6-17 (Supp. 1979).
It is apparent from the statutes cited above by defenSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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dant that Midvale City Ordinance §187(b) was adopted by Midvale
City pursuant to authority granted to it by the legislature and
pursuant to its general police power.

In support of her posi-

tion, defendant directs this court's attention to the fact that
other municipalities within this state have adopted provisions
identical to Midvale City Ordinance §187(b).
City Traffic Code §46-12-206(2)

See,~·

salt Lake

(1974), "The driver of any

vehicle traveling at an unlawful speed shall forfeit any right of
way which he might otherwise have"; Murray Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Code §18-146

(1975), "The driver of any vehicle traveling

at an unlawful speed shall forfeit any right of way which he
might otherwise have".
Defendant maintains that Midvale City Ordinance §187(b)
does not conflict with, and is indeed consistent with, the letter
and spirit of the statutory traffic rules and regulations adopted
by the legislature.

This court has on numerous occasions been

asked to declare a local ordinance void as being in conflict with
a state statute.

See,

~·

Bate

~

318, 445 P.2d 691 (1968); Salt Lake
93 P.2d 671 (1938).

Salt Lake City, 21 Utah 2d
City~

Kusse, 97 Utah 113,

In both cases this court said that no

conflict exists where the city does not attempt to authorize by
its ordinance what the legislature has forbidden, or forbid what
the legislature has expressly licensed, authorized or required.
It is apparent that Midvale City Ordinance §187(b) passes these
tests.
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It is well established in Utah that a right of way

co~

ferred by statute is not an absolute right of way, but that iti
relative and that the rights and duties with respect to such a
right of way must be examined in light of conditions existing
the time.

See,

983 (1967);

~'

~

Hughes v. Hooper, 19 Utah 2d 389, 431 P.2o

Bullock~

Luke, 98 Utah 501, 98 P.2d 350 (1940),

J

Hughes, 431 P.2d at 984, this court said, "Inasmuch as plaintiff
was approaching from the right, he had the absolute right of
over the defendant.

w~

However, this right is not absolute •.• ,•

In Bullock, 98 P.2d at 352, this court recognized that a stututorily conferred right of way may be lost when it said,
"Circumstances may be such, that by his own conduct, he who has
the apparent right of way has lost the benefit of that right .. ,
This court's recognition of the relative nature of a
statutorily conferred right of way is consistent with the posi·
tions taken by a majority of courts in this country, as

eviden~

by the following language from 3 Blashfield, Automobile Law and
Practice §§114.107 and 109 (1965):
General rules as to right of way at
intersections, as based on position
of the vehicles or priority of approach
to the intersection, assume the normal,
reasonable, and lawful operations of
both vehicles, and a vehicle may be
entitled to preferential right of way
only where it proceeds in a lawful
manner. So, where the driver of a
vehicle approaching an intersection
operates his automobile in an unlawful
manner or in violation of law, he loses.
his statutory preferential status, and
the relative rights and duties of vehicles
are governed by the common law.
-16-
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* * *

Statutes governing the rate of speed
on approaching an intersection may
affect the question of the right of
way, the statutory right of way not
being applicable if one or both vehicles
are exceeding the speed limit ••••
Defendant directs this court's attention to Utah Code
Ann. §41-6-46 (Supp. 1979), wherein the legislature acknowledged
that speed that is not reasonable and prudent under the conditions is speed that is prirna facie unlawful.
(1) No person shall drive a
vehicle at a speed greater than is
reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual
potential hazards that exist. Consistent with the foregoing, every
person shall drive at a safe and
appropriate speed when approaching
and crossing an intersection ••••
(2) Where no special hazards exist
the following speed shall be lawful but
any speed in excess of said limit shall
be prirna facie evidence that the speed
is not reasonable or prudent and that
it is unlawful ••••
It is apparent from the above quoted language that the legislature has made it unlawful for a driver to approach an intersection at a speed that is not reasonable and prudent under the conditions.

But what are the ramifications when a driver does

approach an intersection at a speed that is not reasonable and
prudent?

Defendant submits that because a statutorily conferred

right of way in Utah is not absolute and may be lost under
appropriate circumstances, it necessarily follows that a driver
who enters an intersection at a speed that is not reasonable and
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prudent under the circumstances has lost the benefit of any
of way to which she might otherwise be entitled.

ri~

From this it
id~

follows that Midvale City Ordinance §187(b), as well as the
tical ordinances adopted in Salt Lake City and Murray, are

loc~

codifications of the non-inviolate nature of a statutorily conferred right of way.

These ordinances simply remove the benefit

of the right of way conferred by the statute when the driver
seeking to avail himself of a statute is operating his motor
vehicle in an unlawful manner.
Defendant emphasizes that other jurisdictions recogniu
that a statutorily conferred right of way may be forfeited.

In

Dorey .Y..!. Myers, 211 Or. 631, 317 P.2d 585 (1957), an accident
occurred at an intersection when the plaintiff's vehicle,
approaching the intersection from the north, collided with the
defendant's vehicle, approaching the intersection from the west,
Because of the respective directions of the parties, plaintiff
had a statutorily conferred right of way.

At trial, the court

gave the following jury instruction.
Drivers, when approaching highway intersections, shall look out for and give
the right of way to vehicles on the
right, simultaneously approaching a
given point, whether such vehicle first
enters and reaches the intersection or
not. Any driver entering the intersection
at an unlawful speed shall forfeit any
right of way he would otherwise have
under this subsection. 317 P.2d at 588.
The latter portion of this instruction was given in accordance
with Or. Rev. Stat. §483.202(1), which provided, "Any driver
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entering an intersection at an unlawful speed shall forfeit any
right of way he would otherwise have •••

"

Plaintiff, who had

the benefit of the statutory right of way, challenged the trial
court's instruction of forfeiture of rights of way on the ground
that in its initial instruction the lower court failed to tell
the jury that forfeiture of right of way due to unlawful speed
does not transfer the right of way to the other party.

The

Oregon Supreme Court, in affirming the trial court, noted that
the lower court, upon the jury's request for further instructions, did in fact inform the jury that forfeiture of a right of
way by operation of the above quoted statute did not transfer the
right of way to the other party.

The court concluded that the

trial court fully covered the issue of forfeiture of right of way
and that the trial court's instructions given thereon were
proper.
In

Dawson~

Olson, 95 Idaho 295, 507 P.2d 804 (1973),

the Idaho Supreme Court, by implication, acknowledged that where
the law so requires, a driver who is operating her vehicle at an
unlawful speed shall forfeit any right of way to which she otherwise might be entitled.

In the Dawson case, which involved an

intersectional collision, the evidence showed a failure to stop
at the stop sign by the driver of the first vehicle and speeding
by the driver of the second vehicle.

At trial the lower court

gave the following instruction, "You are instructed that the
driver of any vehicle traveling at an unlawful speed shall forfeit any right of way which he might otherwise have."

507 P.2d
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at 805.

The representatives of the occupants of Vehicle 2

excepted to this instruction as prejudicial error in that no law
existed in support of such instruction.

Accordingly, they moved

for a new trial, which motion was granted by the lower court.
The representatives of the occupants of Vehicle 1 appealed to
Supreme Court of Idaho.

~

On appeal the court said,

None of the relevant statutes in effect
at the time of the accident in question
mention forfeiture of right of way due to
excessive speed. Instruction No. 26,
having no statutory authority to support
it, was an improper instruction of the
law existing at the time of the accident.
Although a statute providing for forfeiture of right of way in cases of
unlawful speed may have a salutary effect
on discouraging excessive speed in connection with open and possibly even
favored intersections, no such provision
exists in the Idaho Code presently.* * *
Even if such a statute were in force in
Idaho, howver, the fact that a favored
driver under a right of way statute could
forfeit his right of way by excessive
speed would not transfer the right of way
to the other driver. 507 P.2d at 806,807.
That the above quoted language is an implicit recognition of the rule which defendant now seeks to have adopted by
this court is apparent in light of the Idaho Supreme Court's
decision in Bell Y..!. Carlson, 75 Idaho 193, 270 P.2d 420 (1954),
wherein the court said:
Furthermore, at the time of the accident,
the Carlson car was admittedly traveling
at an unlawful speed and under section
49-520,I.C., in force at that time, this
driver thereby forfeited any right of way
he might otherwise have had. 270 P.2d at
424.
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Defendant notes that a substantial weight of authority
supports her position.

See

~·

Ziegler v. Carley, 156

Cal.App.2d 643, 320 P.2d 165 (1958); Amos v. Remington Arms
Company, 117 Colo. 399, 188 P.2d 896 (1948);
349 So.2d 420 (La.App. 1977);

Holloway~

Zema~

Louviere,

Cronk, 76 Mich.App.

577, 257 N.W.2d 175 (1977); Merrill v. Kjelgren, 160 N.W.2d 155
(Minn. 1968); Vavrina
N.E.2d 408 (1974) i

~

Greczanik, 40 Ohio App.2d 129, 318

Rickets~

Tusa, 214 N.W.2d 77 (S.D. 1974).

Defendant submits that because plaintiff was determined
to have been traveling at a speed that was not reasonable and
prudent under the circumstances, plaintiff was traveling at an
"unlawful speed" within the meaning of Midvale City Ordinance
§187(b).

Therefore, plaintiff, under this ordinance, forfeited

any right of way to which she was otherwise entitled.

Because

the trial court refused defendant's requested jury instruction
which stated the operation and effect of Midvale City Ordinance
§187(b) and subsequently denied defendant's motion for a new
trial based on the court's refusal to give such an instruction,
defendant submits that the court twice committed prejudicial
error.
POINT III.
BY ENGAGING IN EXTENSIVE EXAMINATION OF
PLAINTIFF'S WITNESSES AND USURPING THE
FUNCTION OF PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL, THE COURT
BELOW DENIED DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR
AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL.
Defendant submits that the court below prejudiced
defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial by its extensive

-21-
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examination of plaintiff's witnesses.

transcr~

A review of the

of testimony given at trial reveals that the lower court asked 1
less than 95 questions of witnesses during the trial
Appendix).

(See

Of these 95 questions, 90 were asked of plaintiff's

witnesses during examination by plaintiff's counsel or simply
during examination of witnesses by plaintiff's counsel.

The

remaining 5 questions were asked during examination of witnesq
by defendant's counsel.
This court's most recent statement on this issue is
found in

State~

Mellen, 583 P.2d 46 (Utah 1978), a criminal

proceeding wherein this court said:
[T]he judge should and normally does
exercise restraint in examining witnesses, so that he does not unduly
intrude into the trial or encroach upon
the function of counsel.

* * *

Notwithstanding what has just been said,
the judge does have a function beyond
sitting as a comparatively silent monitor
of proceedings. In order to discharge
his responsibility of carrying out the
above stated objective, it is within his
prerogative to ask whatever questions of
witnesses as in his judgment is [are]
necessary or desirable to clarify,
explain or add to the eVIdence as it
relates to d'ISputed""Tssues. 58~P-:2d at
48. [Emphasis added.]
It is evident from the above quoted language that extensive eD
mination of witnesses is not contemplated as being within the
proper function of a trial court.

Examination of witnesses by

the trial court should be restricted to the purposes of
clarifying, explaining or adding to evidence already accepted.
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Defendant submits that the lower court abused its
discretion by surpassing the limits on this discretion as set
forth in the Mellen case.

At one point, during direct examina-

tion of Officer Elsby by plaintiff's counsel, the court below
asked 22 consecutive questions.

(See Appendix, pp. 28-31).

Examination of the questions submitted to witnesses by the trial
court reveals that they were directed towards the introduction of
evidence which plaintiff's counsel was capable of establishing
without the help of the lower court.

It is evident that the

trial court did in fact encroach upon the functions of
plaintiff's counsel.

Because such conduct on the part of the

trial court was an abuse of its discretion, defendant submits
that such conduct denied her a fair and impartial trial.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's vehicle was not "an immediate hazard" within
the meaning of the statute so as to require defendant to yield
the right of way to plaintiff.

Should this court agree with the

lower court's determination that plaintiff's vehicle was, in
fact, an "immediate hazard", defendant still could not be guilty
of failure to yield the right of way to plaintiff because plaintiff, because she was operating her vehicle at a speed that was
not reasonable and prudent under the circumstances, forfeited,
under Midvale City Ordinance §187(b), any right of way to which
she might otherwise be entitled.

Because the lower court failed to

instruct the jury as to the operation and effect of this ordiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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nance, despite defendant's request to do so, the lower

court~

mitted reversible error in failing to instruct the jury on the
applicable law.

Finally, the lower court committed reversible

error by its extensive examination of witnesses and by

usurpi~

the function of plaintiff's counsel.
Inasmuch as the lower court denied defendant's motion
for a new trial based upon such prejudicial errors, it is

res~

tively submitted that the judgment of the lower court should

~

reversed with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the
defendant or, in the alternative, that a new trial be granted.
Dated this 10th day of October, 1979.
Respectfully submitted,
STRONG & HANNI

B.(__.-=---+-:z:~~~<:-;:;-:----.1-C-~~~~""1

L.
E HAYS
Attorneys for Defendant/A
604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
MAILING CERTIFICATE

Mailed two copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief H

J. Kent Holland of Hanson, Russon, Hanson & Dunn, Attorneys for
Plaintiff/Respondent, 702 Kearns Building, Salt Lake City, Utah
84101, this 10th day of October, 1979.
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APPENDIX
Excerpts from transcript of testimony taken in lower
court showing examination of witnesses by lower court.

Excerpts

are indexed to page and line of such transcript.
WITNESS:

GRANT W. ELSBY

DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. HOLLAND

* * *
Page 8
l

2
3

THE COURT:

Let's ask him this.

Did you make

various measurements, Sir?
A.

You mean at the time of the accident, or--

4

THE COURT:

You made measurements I say, measure-

s

ments of the street and other points of significance when

6

you arrived?

7

A.

Yes.

* * *
15
16

17

THE COURT:

Alright.

How did you make the measure-

men ts?
A.

The measurements are made by a contraption that

18

has a wheel and it is metered and it reads it off in feet

19

and inches.
THE COURT:

20

21

A.

22

You pole [roll] that from one point to another?

We role it from one point to another, yes.
THE COURT:

I think he--can you tell us what measure-

23

ments you did make and what they were.

24

map.

-25-

What you put on the
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25
26

A.

The measurements we made was basically where both

cars were situated in the road.
* * *
Page 9

1

THE COURT:

The record may show he has referred to

2

the defendant.

3

with any marks or just a car?

4

5

A.

That is car mark marked on your diagram,

s:

On the diagram, it is marked as Vehicle No., I

believe 1, let me just check.
* * *
Page 10

17

THE COURT:

The answer will be stricken and I

18

sustain the objection.

19

the width of the street, each side of the street?

20

A.

21

As far as the width of the street, no, I did not.
THE COURT:

22

street?

23

A.

Did you measure the streets, Offia

You didn't measure either side of the

The only measurement I made was using this curb as

24

a base line to put the cars in this position or from here

25

but as far as measuring the width of the street, I did not

26

measure the width of the street.

27

THE COURT:

Do you have a judgment from your observ

28

tions and opinion how wide the travelled portion of that

29

street is in th area of the accident?
* * *
Page 11
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THE COURT:

3

How wide is it?

* * *
THE COURT:

10

The north half of the street, alright.

11

How far is it from what you call PI to where the defendant's

12

car came to a stop, Sir, or did you measure from the manhole

13

cover?

14

A.

We have from the manhole cover.

* * *
THE COURT:

18

19
20

A.

To the rear of the car.

To the rear of the car from this point here to the

rear of the car is approximately 94 feet 9 inches.

* * *
THE COURT:

24

25
26

How far was it to the other car, what

we have called the Plaintiff's Car?

A.

This car here?

* * *
THE COURT:

29
30

A.

From the manhole cover?

From the manhole cover.
Page 12
THE COURT:

1

2
3
4

PI from the manhole cover?
A.

From the probable PI to our reference point, the man-

hole cover is 11 feet 6 inches.

5
6

How far from what you have called the

THE COURT:

A.

That is 11 feet 6 inches East?

Yes.

-27-
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7

THE COURT:

So those cars would be an additional

8

approximately 7 feet farther west than the measurements,

9

the probable point of impact to wher they came to stop,

10

the distance you measured plus approximately 7 feet?

11

A.

12
13
14

THE COURT:

Where was the impact of the Defendant's

car, did you observe?
A.

15
16

Seven feet, correct.

On the Defendant's car?
THE COURT:

A.

17

Yes.

Was the right rear area.
THE COURT:

Well, was it on the rear to the right

18

side of the rear or the rear of the right side, do you

19

recall, Sir?

20

A.

21
22
23

Basically-THE COURT:

The back of the car to the right side

or the side of the car to the back side if you recall?
A.

Around the rear fender and to the--I call it the

24

right rear which would take in bumper and fender in area

25

in here.

26
27
28
29
30

THE COURT:

Did you observe ever the damage to

Plaintiff's car?
A.

Yes.

The damage to that car was the left rear.

THE COURT:

The left rear fender.

What did you

find at the probable point of impact, you say you found di
Page 13

1

t~

anything else?
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2

A.

3

Dirt and broken glass.
THE COURT:

And in your experience as a police

4

officer investigating accidents have you observed what

5

happened when two vehicles collided, when a moving vehicle

6

collides with another car, two moving vehicles, what happens

7

to the dirt on the under side of the car?

8
9

A.

of the vehicles are jarred loose.

10
11
12
13

THE COURT:

16

A.

19

THE COURT:

A.

24

A.

What is the surface of this street?

The surface is asphalt, extremely well travelled,

polished as we would call it.
THE COURT:
A.

Old asphalt then.

Yes.
THE COURT:

And is the entire north half of the

street asphalt?
A.

You mean this section here?
THE COURT:

25

26

In the general area.
THE COURT:

22
23

In the general area of the probable

point of impact?

20
21

The glass from the taillight and the taillights

from both vehicles were broken out and we found those lying

17
18

That is called debry [debris] of the accident.

And where does the glass come from?

14
15

When they collide the dirt from the under carriage

A.

Yes.

Yes, it is.
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27

THE COURT:

Are there dividing lines, dividing

la~

28

of traffic for west bound traffc on the north half of the

29

street?

30

A.

The center lines, yes, they are divided.
Page 14

1
2
3

THE COURT:

A.

Oh, by lanes.
THE COURT:

5

A.

6

traffic.

7

9

12

15

We have two.

There is two lanes for west bound

One is wider than the other I take it

from looking at the diagram?
A.

It appears the north section is a little bit wider.
THE COURT:

Which would include would it generally

be a parking area?
A.

13
14

By marking.

THE COURT:

10
11

How many lanes is it

divided into by lanes?

4

8

How many?

Yes.

There are parking stalls here.

THE COURT:

And which lane was the probable point

of impact in which lane, Sir?
A.

It was on the inside lane closest to the island.

16

THE COURT:

Alright, you may continue, Mr. Holland.

17

MR. HOLLAND:

Thank you very much, Your Honor.
Page 15

* * *
6
7

Q.

Alright.

In your training as a police officer,

were you ever trained to make a coefficiency of friction
-30-
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B

test?

9

THE COURT:

On the surface of a highway.

10

Q.

On the surface of a highway?

11

A.

Yes, I have.
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION BY MR. SUMMERHAYS
Page 16

* * *
lB

THE COURT:

Was there any difference in the surface

19

of the highway that you could observe between where the

20

test was made and the area where the accident occurred?

21

A.

22

road.

I could tell no difference in the surface of the

DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. HOLLAND
Page 17

* * *
THE COURT:

9
10
11
12

How did you make the test, Sir?
A.

THE COURT:
A.

15
16

The test, I drove my police vehicle at a given

speed and at a given point I applied the brakes.

13
14

He is going to tell us what he did.

Thirty miles an hour.
THE COURT:

A.

Do you recall what speed you drove at?

At thirty, alright.

At thirty miles an hour and then we applied the

17

brakes at a given point, measured the amount of skid marks

18

and in that way were able to determine the coeff iciency or
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19

the drag factor of the roadway.

20
21
22
23

THE COURT:

Based upon the length and time it took

to stop by--where did you get the figures you used?
A.

North Western University, they publish a book and

a

scale that we use.
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION BY MR. SUMMERHAYS
Page 18

* * *
13

THE COURT:

You have got a length of time he is

14

asking you, after you apply the brakes, it takes some ti•

15

to get the brakes to take hold and get applied?

16
17

A.

You mean the reaction time from the time you take

your foot off the gas to the brake?

* * *
THE COURT:

23
24
25

What he is talking about you don't leM

a tire mark until the wheels lock?
A.

That is correct.
THE COURT:

26

If there is any slowing down of the

27

wheels before they lock you are not leaving a tire mark,

28

skid mark at that time?

29

A.

a

That would be correct.
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. HOLLAND
Page 19

* * *
11

12

THE COURT:

What is the coefficient of friction

you determined from the brake marks you made at thirty mil
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13

an hour?

14

A.

15

We came up with sixty-five, sixty-five coefficient

of friction.

16

THE COURT:

Sixty-five.

Is that generally used

17

with sixty-five percent, is that the general terminology

18

or what is it, .65?

19

A.

I believe so.

* * *
Page 20
1
2
3

THE COURT:

they skid marks could you determine?
A.

4
5
6

What do you have tire marks or were

They were skid marks.
THE COURT:

A.

Leave black rubber on the lawn?

Not black rubber but, you could tell where the

tires had bounced up and they drug through the snow.

* * *
Page 21

* * *
17
18

THE COURT:

How many brake marks did you measure

prior to the point of impact, Sir?

19

Q.

How many wheel marks did you mark as--

20

A.

There was two distinct lines showing the left and

21
22
23

the right tires.
THE COURT:

Both the front and rear tires, could

determine from observation of the skid marks whether all were
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24

25

locked or not?
A.

THE COURT:

26
27

then?

28

A.

They tracked pretty well into each

ot~

Both cars were tracking fairly straight.
THE COURT:

29
30

In my opinion it appeared that all four were lockec

So you feel you had--you couldn't tell

though--which ones locked first, the front or the back?
Page 22

l

A.

I could not tell that no.
THE COURT:

2

Could you tell whether they all four

3

left actually the same amount of mark or were you able to

4

determine how much each wheel left?

5

6

A.

I did not determine.

I just determined the overall

from the start to the stopping.
THE COURT:

7

You couldn't determine how far the

8

front locked or how far the back locked, a total of all

9

of them?

10

A.

THE COURT:

11
12
13

Including the total of the front, the

total of the back is that correct, Sir?
A.

14
15

No.

That is all it is, yes.
THE COURT:

Q.

Alright.

Now, this possible point of impact that you have

16

marked on here, do you recall how far it was from the end

17

the island to that portion?

18

A.

From the probable point of impact to the end of
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19

the island is 4'5".

20
21
22

THE COURT:
A.

25

THE COURT:

28

A.

That is correct.
THE COURT:

How far from the north of the island

was it did you measure that or from the manhole?
A.

29
30

The impact then was 4' West of the

end of the island?

26
27

The point of the island or the end of the island

would be 4'5" farther east.

23
24

Which direction, Sir?

To the north of the island?
THE COURT:

Yes.

Everything is north of the island

isn't it?
Page 23

1

A.

Well, the accident--what was your question--no, we

2

brought our other measurements as far as putting this car

3

off this curb here and came this way.

4

way.

I don't come out this

* * *
Page 26

* * *
14
15
16

THE COURT:

Was that stop sign there the day of the

accident, Sir?
A.

Yes, it was, yes.

* * *
26

THE COURT:

Let's see that, Sir.

You are standing
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27
28

on the island aren't you, Sir?
A.

29
30

In relationship to the end of the island.
THE COURT:

You are standing west of the island

where you determined the probable impact.

You are

stand~

Page 27
1

on the island in an area east and west of the end of the

2

island?

3

A.

Correct.
* * *
THE COURT:

12

13
14

How far west is that from the end of

the island generally?
A.

I am approximately here because I am showing since

15

Mr. Summerhays' diagram is to scale, I am looking approxi:

16

just like this, this is what I am looking at this-* * *
Page 28
* * *
THE COURT:

22
23

24

We are only concerned about the

plai~

Was she injured, did you observe whether she was or was n
A.

Yes, I observed she was injured.

25

THE COURT:

26

to her condition.

You can tell us what you observed as

27

Q.

What did you observe as to her condition?

28

A.

At that point I determined there was some type of

29

either back or neck type or spinal injury.
* * *
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Page 29

* * *
26
27
28

THE COURT:

Do you recall, driver No. 2 you talked

to you say?
A.

Yes.

* * *
Page 30

* * *
19
20

THE COURT:
A.

Where did it take place?

It took place, I can't really remember the exact

21

location we were but it ws in the general area of the acci-

22

dent.

23
24
25

THE COURT:
A.

28
29

Whoever was in the defendant's vehicle, the--

a police officer and there were several firemen around.

26
27

Who else was present?

THE COURT:

Were they involved in the conversation

or just in the general area?
A.

I think they were just in the general area trying

to hear and see what was going on.

30

THE COURT:

And how long after you arrived did it
Page 31

1
2

take place, just your general, best estimate.
A.

Maybe ten, fifteen minutes.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SUMMERHAYS

* * *

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-37-

Page 38

* * *
THE COURT:

26
27
28
29

All of the debry [debris] of impact

w~

within that lane, that is what you are saying.
A.

Are you asking me that question?

Yes, it was.

* * *
WITNESS:

RACHEL ARHELINDA CINTRON DOYLE

DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. HOLLAND

* * *
Page 46

* * *
29
30

THE COURT:

Where was your car when, you said you

observed she wasn't going to stop is your testimony.

Wh~

Page 47
1

2

was your car at that time in relation to the
A.

intersectio~

I was approximately right about where the left

3

hand turn--just above that, not quite--! don't know how b

4

explain it.

* * *
Page 56

* * *
28

THE COURT:

Where did you first see the defendant'1

29

vehicle, the automobile driven by the defendant, where

30

it when you first saw it?
Page 57
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w~

1

A.

I first seen her when she was back in here.

* * *
6

7
8

THE COURT:
from-A.

9
10

Did you watch her continue to proceed

From the stop sign?
THE COURT:

A.

Yes.

Yes, I did.

* * *
WITNESS, RUDOLF LIMPERT
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. HOLLAND

* * *
Page 78b

* * *
4
5

THE COURT:
A.

6

7

Yes.
THE COURT:

A.

Does that include perception you say?

Perception and reaction?

Yes, Your Honor.

* * *
12

THE COURT:

Let's help the jury this way.

At

13

thirty-five miles per hour how far does--how fast does a car

14

travel say--you have told us a second, Sir.

15

A.

Yes.

* * *
Page 78c

* * *
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THE COURT:

19
20
21

Based on the thirty-five mile per hour

assumption, what is the total reaction time?
A.

The total time consists of the reaction time of

22

one second, the sliding time during which the vehicle

23

slides and that is entirely out of control of the driver,

24

is a function of the deceleration of the vehicle and the

25

distance it slid and it take .9 seconds to slide from

26

five miles an hour a distance of 37.5 feet at a

27

friction of .65 and then at the end of the 37.5 feet

28

we have 26 feet unbraked travel and that takes • 8 seconds,

29

.8 seconds.

30

from it where the skid marks stop to the point of impact,

th~

coeffici~
sli~

So i f we add the .8 during the unbraked slidi

Page 78d
l

plus the sliding time of .9 gives us 1. 7 plus the one sect

2

reaction time gives us 2.7 seconds during which Plaintiff

3

had to react to lock the wheels, to take evasive action.

* * *
Page 78e

* * *
10

THE COURT:

Let's ask him do you have any experio

11

Dr. Limpert, in acceleration speeds of automobiles froma

12

stopped position with a, say up to ten miles an hour,

13

acceleration speed?

14

A.

Yes, Your Honor.

* * *
Page 78g
-40-
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t~

* * *
30

THE COURT:

When she reacted, that is--would that
Page 78h

l

be proper?

2

have been twenty feet back at the average of five?

3

A.

At the time she reacted, the Defendant would

To make it exactly clear 2.7 seconds prior to the

4

time of impact at the time the Plaintiff had to recognize

5

the hazard.

* * *
10

11
12

THE COURT:

Her reaction based upon the facts you

had was at that point.
A.

Yes.

When her brake began to react.

* * *
Page 79

* * *
WITNESS:

LONNIE M. HIYAGISHIMA

DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. HOLLAND
22
23
24

THE COURT:

Don't lead her, Sir.

Just tell us where

you were sitting what direction you were facing.
A.

Well, I was turned.

* * *
Page 81

* * *
13
14

THE COURT:
A.

Did you talk to Mrs. Doyle?

No, I did not.
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* * *
THE COURT:

28
29

before?

30

A.

Had you ever travelled on that Street

Oh, Yes.

* * *
Page 85

* * *
26
27
28

THE COURT:
you were in?
A.

29
30

Where was it in relation to the car

I don't know.
THE COURT:

A.

Front, along side or behind?

It might have fell behind, I am not sure.

* * *
Page 87

* * *
30

THE COURT:

Did you observe whether there was anyb
Page 88

1

in the car other than the driver?
A.

2

I could see a passenger in the front.
WITNESS:

TANYA SALAZAR

DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. HOLLAND

* * *
Page 92

* * *
26
27

THE COURT:

What was your sister's condition at

that time?
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28

A.

THE COURT:

29
30

Well, she says that her--

A.

No, how did she appear looking to you?

Well, she was pale and she was waiving-WITNESS:

LYNNETTE LEMMON

RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. HOLLAND

* * *
Page 112

* * *
THE COURT:

5
6
7

Ask--don't--where was Rachael's car

in relation to your mother's car when you looked around?
A.

When I looked around she was in the lanes like I

8

described that was when it was just seconds before the impact,

9

just really fast.

* * *
WITNESS:

MRS. MILKOVICH

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. HOLLAND

* * *
Page 123
THE COURT:

19
20

21

Did you ever see the other car, ever

see it before the collision?
A.

No.

-43-
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